



CHAPTER

5 Standing for Something

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Abstract

This chapter evaluates the integrated-self, identity, and clean hands pictures of integrity, suggested by the work of Harry Frankfurt and Bernard Williams, among others. The chapter argues that all three pictures reduce integrity to something else with which it is not equivalent—to the conditions for unified agency, or for continuing as the same self, or for having reason to refuse cooperating with evil. The analysis of why integrity is a virtue is also limited by the assumption that integrity is solely a personal virtue. This chapter argues that integrity is the social virtue of standing before others for what, in one's best judgment, is worth doing.

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We admire and trust those who have integrity, take pride in our own, rue its absence in politics, and regret our own failures to act with integrity. Clearly, integrity is a virtue, but it is less clear what it is a virtue *of* or why we might prize it.

Three pictures of integrity have gained philosophical currency, particularly through the work of Bernard Williams, Gabriel Taylor, Lynne McFall, and Jeffrey Blustein.¹ I will call these the *integrated-self*, *identity*, and *clean hands* pictures of integrity. On the integrated-self view, integrity involves the integration of “parts” of oneself—desires, evaluations, commitments—into a whole. On the identity view, integrity means fidelity to those projects and principles that are constitutive of one's core identity. On the clean-hands view, integrity means maintaining the purity of one's own agency, especially in dirty-hands situations.

I am going to sketch out each of these pictures of integrity and suggest two general criticisms. First, each ultimately reduces integrity to something else with which it is not equivalent—to the conditions of unified agency, to the conditions for continuing as the same self, and to the conditions for having reason to refuse cooperating with some evils. Second, all three accounts are of integrity as a personal, but not also a ↵ social virtue. This limits the analysis both of what integrity is and of why it is a virtue. In the last section, I will suggest a way of understanding integrity as a social virtue.

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I. The Integrated-Self Picture of Integrity

Etymologically, “integrity” is related to “integer,” a whole number, and to “integration,” the unification of parts into a whole. The integrated-self picture of integrity begins from this etymological observation, and the resulting description of the person of integrity as a whole integrated self owes a good deal to Harry Frankfurt's work on freedom and responsibility.²

On this view, the integration of the self, and hence integrity, requires first that one not be a “wanton.” Frankfurt imagines wantons to be individuals who either lack the capacity or simply fail to deliberate and make up their minds about which of their desires they want to be volitionally effective. As a result, wantons act on whichever desire happens to be psychologically strongest at the moment. Because the wanton is passive in relation to what moves him, Frankfurt concludes that the wanton’s desires are, in an important sense, not *his* and, as a result, neither are his actions. Such a being lacks integrity altogether. He does not, in Frankfurt’s view, have a self, because it is only by endorsing a particular desire that an agent claims it as his own and thereby constitutes his self.³

p. 125 Integrity, however, requires a good deal more than simple nonwantonness with respect to one’s first-order desires. First, both weakness of will and self-deception undermine the individual’s ability to act on her actual or professed endorsements. The weak-willed person ends up not having “the will he wants, but one that is imposed upon him by a force ↵ with which he does not identify and which is in that sense external to him.”⁴ The self-deceived person is unable to see what actually motivates her. She thinks it is one thing (for instance, cautiousness) when in fact it is something else (cowardice). As a result, the will she has is not the one she claims to want. In both cases, what the agent does is not integrated with what she endorses or claims to endorse.

Second, in a variety of ways, wantonness can infect one’s endorsements—that is, one’s second-order desires. Thus, even individuals who reflect on the sort of person they want to be may fail to do so in an adequately self-constituting way. As Gabriel Taylor argues, *how* one comes to endorse a first-order desire matters. If a person adopts values only because her group does, without having any reasons of her own for thinking that these are the right values, then her second-order volitions will not really be her own. “[S]he has to find out from others which desires to identify with, or indeed what sorts of desires she should have.”⁵ In addition, as Taylor also observes, unless the individual regards her endorsements as *prima facie* committing her to making the same endorsements on future occasions, she will be no more than shallowly sincere, wholeheartedly identifying with one set of desires today and a different set tomorrow.⁶ Both the crowd follower and the shallowly sincere exhibit second-order wantonness and a lack of integrity.⁷ Such wantonness appears avoidable, and integrity achievable, only if a person’s endorsements are determined by her own practical reasoning.

p. 126 Frankfurt raises a further possibility that reflective individuals may fail to identify *wholeheartedly* with their volitions. They may have inconsistent second-order desires. Or alternatively, they may be ambivalent about whether they want to identify with a particular desire. Both inconsistency and ambivalence result in there being “no unequivocal answer to the question of what the person really wants.”⁸ The individual ↵ cannot wholeheartedly say “I will” because there is no unified self to back the willing. She lacks integrity. Wholeheartedness, and with it integrity, would require integrating competing desires into a single ordering, as well as separating some desires from the self and relegating them to “outlaw” status. “It is these acts of ordering and of rejection—integration and separation—that create a self out of the raw materials of inner life.”⁹

This picture of integrity has intuitive appeal. It captures our sense that people with integrity decide what they stand for and have their own settled reasons for taking the stands they do. They are not wantons or crowd followers or shallowly sincere. Nor are they so weak willed or self-deceived that they cannot act on what they stand for. The actions of persons of integrity express a clearly defined identity as an evaluating agent.

One might, however, wonder whether integrity is nothing but a matter of self-integration. On the integrated-self picture, any person whose actions are fully determined by her own endorsements has integrity. But consider Thomas E. Hill Jr.’s example of an artist who lacks self-respect and, it seems, lacks integrity as well: “Suppose an artist of genius and originality paints a masterwork unappreciated by his contemporaries. Cynically, for money and social status, he alters the painting to please the tasteless public and then turns out copies in machine-like fashion. He does it deliberately, with full awareness of his reasons.”¹⁰ His pandering to public opinion, silencing his own aesthetic judgments, and selling out his standards for material gain reveal a lack of integrity. Yet there seems no reason to think that *he* does not fully determine his actions. He does, but without integrity. Integrity, one might intuitively think, involves *not* subordinating one’s own judgment about what makes art worthy of being produced and appreciated to considerations of personal comfort, gain, status, and expediency. (In the final section, I will suggest why this is so.)

p. 127 One might also wonder if what Frankfurt calls “wholeheartedness”—the consistency of and nonambivalence about one’s various ↪ endorsements—is really a necessary condition for having integrity. Wholeheartedness might instead be an ideal of unified agency. That is, as agents, we might wish we could be wholehearted about what we do. But being of two minds might not make what we do any less ours and thus might not pose any special threat to integrity. Because the notion of wholeheartedness regularly occupies a central place in philosophical accounts of integrity, it is worth probing whether it should.¹¹ Taking inconsistency and ambivalence in turn, I will sketch out two examples that suggest that integrity may sometimes in fact *require* resisting the impulse to resolve inconsistencies and ambivalence.

Inconsistency

Maria Lugones has repeatedly argued for the value of conceptualizing oneself as a duplicitous or multiplicitous being whose identity is differently constituted in different cultural worlds or meaning systems.¹² The identity “Latina,” for example, is differently constituted in Hispanic and in racist Anglo cultures. Racist oppression consists, in part, in the suppression of the Hispanic cultural understanding of what it means to be Latina. And thus for Lugones, struggling against racist oppression partly consists in endorsing and affirming her identity as a Latina as it is constituted within Hispanic culture. Many people, however, confront multiple oppressions. Lugones, for instance, is both Latina and lesbian. In struggling against multiple oppressions, she is faced with the task of affirming not only her Latina identity as it is constituted within Hispanic culture but also her lesbian identity as it is constituted within nonheterosexual lesbian communities. But the meaning and value systems (for example, concerning gender, sexuality, and family) that make those two identities possible are in conflict. Within Hispanic culture, lesbianism is an abomination. Within the lesbian community, Hispanic values and ↪ ways of living do not have central value. As a result, “Latina lesbian” is not a coherent identity nor is there a single, unified conceptual and normative perspective that could count as the “Latina lesbian” perspective, and thus no single perspective from which to take issue with both racist and heterosexual oppression.¹³ “I do not know,” she writes, “whether the two possibilities can ever be integrated so that I can become, at least in these respects, a unitary being. I don’t even know whether that would be desirable. But it seems clear to me that each possibility need not exclude the other *so long as* I am not a unitary but a multiplicitous being.”¹⁴

What Lugones’s case illustrates is that lack of wholeheartedness does not necessarily signal some personal failure on the part of the agent to make up her mind what she really wants. Agents can have reasons to resist resolving value conflicts. In Lugones’s case, taking a stand against oppressions—something a person with integrity might well do—involves endorsing and struggling to preserve meaning and value systems that conflict with each other. To insist that, even in these cases, integrity requires wholeheartedness would be to make practical deliberation over whether a value conflict *ought* to be resolved oddly irrelevant to integrity.

Ambivalence

p. 129 A similar point may be made about ambivalence. In his autobiography *Cures: A Gay Man’s Odyssey*, Martin Duberman describes his ↪ ambivalence about his therapist’s suggestion that they team-teach a seminar at Princeton where Duberman was a history professor. The therapist, Karl, claims that team teaching will help cure Duberman’s homosexuality by allowing him to work closely with a caring male. “Because your father was so distant,” the therapist tells him, “you cannot believe to this day that an adult male could care about you—and indeed that’s the main reason you pursue males sexually, and especially unavailable males like hustlers: it’s a way of belatedly trying to get your father’s love while simultaneously confirming that you can’t.”¹⁵ Duberman, however, suspects that the team-teaching idea has more to do with his therapist’s ego than with therapy. In response to Karl’s suggestion, he says, “I could feel myself stiffen with distrust. And then, two seconds later, with self-distrust, as I instantly questioned whether my suspicion about Karl’s motives wasn’t precisely the reflexive skepticism about an older man’s kindly interest in me that we had just finished analyzing.”¹⁶ Caught between his own suspicions and his therapist’s authoritative judgment, Duberman is faced with the choices of dismissing his therapist’s judgment in favor of his own, or of acceding to his therapist’s judgment and silencing his suspicions, or of remaining in a state of ambivalence.

One might think that, as a person with integrity, Duberman should have stood up for his own suspicions. Indeed, one might generally think that whenever one’s own and others’ interpretations of one’s motives conflict, one ought to resolve that conflict in favor of one’s own judgment. The integrated-self picture of integrity suggests just this conclusion. Feminists have also tended toward this view.¹⁷ Recognizing that

ambivalence is generally endemic among members of oppressed groups who suspect that dominant interpretations of their motives and actions are mistaken, but for whom there are as yet no clearly articulated arguments discrediting dominant views, ↳ feminists have regarded such socially produced ambivalence as destructive of integrity. For reasons that will become clearer in the last section, I am unpersuaded that this is so. Anyone who regards herself as an equal in autonomous judgment to others cannot be indifferent to what others think. When one's own and others' judgments come into serious conflict, ambivalence may be a way of acknowledging that equality. Ambivalence does not necessarily signal a failure on the agent's part to make up his mind about what he really believes and wants. Agents can have reasons to resist resolving ambivalence. In particular, they may think it important to acknowledge a basic assumption underlying practical deliberation—namely the equality of deliberators.

In sum, the integrated-self picture of integrity, though outlining some important, necessary conditions of integrity (for example, not being a mere crowd follower), reduces integrity to volitional unity. As a result, it obscures the fact that persons can have reason to resist resolving conflicting commitments and ambivalence about their own desires, and thus that resisting wholeheartedness may sustain integrity rather than be symptomatic of its absence.¹⁸ In addition, the integrated-self picture of integrity places no restrictions on the kinds of reasons that can motivate persons with integrity. But simply acting on one's own reasons seems insufficient for integrity. Some sorts of reasons seem incompatible with integrity—for instance, a primary concern with one's own comfort, material gain, pleasure, and the like at the expense of one's own judgments about what is worth doing.

II. The Identity Picture of Integrity

A second picture of integrity owes a good deal to Bernard Williams's work.¹⁹ On this view, integrity is a matter of having a character and being true to it. To have a character, as Williams sees it, is to have some ground projects with which one is so strongly identified that in their absence one would not be able to find meaning in one's life or have a reason for going on. Because both Kantianism and utilitarianism require that agents be prepared to give up their ground projects in the name of impartial good ordering or the maximization of good states of affairs, both moral systems are, in his view, hostile to agents' integrity.

Picturing integrity as fidelity to projects that the individual deeply identifies with has intuitive appeal. It captures in a way that the integrated-self picture did not the idea that persons with integrity stand for something. On the integrated-self picture, a person "stands for" all of the desires that she does not regard as alien or outlaw forces, no matter how trivial those desires might be. Thus, one's integrity is implicated in everything one does. The identity picture, by contrast, discriminates between desires that are basic to one's sense of self and those that are not. A person with integrity stands for those desires that are constitutive of her core self. This explains why such persons might prefer death to the betrayal of what they stand for.

Although Williams was explicitly concerned with integrity, his discussions of integrity all occur within the context of formulating objections to Kantian impartiality and the utilitarian conception of negative responsibility. He was, in particular, concerned with securing a space for individuals' partiality to their personal, identity-constituting projects against the seemingly relentless demands of morality. A central part of his argument was that individuals will not have a reason to care about their own future, including their future in a morality system, unless they have some ground projects whose pursuit propels them into the future.²⁰ Even if Williams was right to insist that Kantian and utilitarian morality demand too much of agents, one can still question ↳ whether integrity really is, and is nothing but, being true to what one deeply identifies with.

Those who endorse the identity picture of integrity admit that, on this view, one might have integrity even though one's identity-conferring projects are nonmoral, or even morally despicable. This is because deeply identifying with what one does puts one's integrity beyond question. The Gauguin portrayed by Williams, for example, stakes his deepest sense of self on his desire to realize his painterly gifts. Gauguin "is not pictured as thinking that he will have earned his place in the world, if his project is affirmed: that a distinctive contribution to the world will have been made, if his distinctive project is carried forward. The point is that he wants these things, finds his life bound up with them, and that they propel him forward, and thus they give him a reason for living his life."²¹ Although taking his moral obligations seriously, this Gauguin does not regard them as identity-conferring in the deepest sense. Morality, for him, is not a ground project. Thus, when moral obligation conflicts with his deep identity as a painter, preserving his integrity requires that he betray his moral commitments.

Agreeing that integrity can take nonmoral forms, must we also agree that Gauguin acts with integrity just because he so deeply identifies with painting? This, I think, depends on what we mean by "identity" and "identification." It is possible, first, to understand identity as a psychological phenomenon. From a psychological point of view we might understand who we are in terms of our deepest impulses and what feels natural or unforced. Identifying with a desire would not, in this case, entail that the agent also endorses the desire she identifies with. If we have any reason to doubt Gauguin's integrity, it is because we suspect that identifying with a project may differ from endorsing it and that Gauguin's reason for pursuing his painterly project is his identification with it, not his endorsement. To clarify this distinction between psychological identification and endorsement, I draw once again on an example from Duberman's *Cures*.

During his two-decades-long pursuit of a psychotherapeutic cure for his homosexuality, Duberman accepted the then dominant view of homosexuality as a neurotic and pathological barrier to a loving, committed relationship. Making what was called a "heterosexual adjustment" was, he thought, his only hope for a healthy, happy life. Repeatedly entering therapy for a cure, he just as repeatedly quit, being both unwilling to follow his therapists' injunction to stop "acting out" his homosexuality and convinced that he could not change. He vacillated between terminating relationships for enforced celibacy and arranging his life to accommodate frequent trips to New York gay bars.

His refusal to endorse his desire for men seems clear from the narrative. He says, "Accepting it [namely the decision to quit therapy] means accepting my life, being satisfied with it. And I can't. . . ."²² But it seemed equally clear both to himself and to his aggravated therapists that he did not identify with the therapeutic goals he endorsed. He was in his words an "onlooker, an auditor, rather than a participant" in the therapeutic process.²³

Cases like Duberman's, where identification and endorsement part company, force us to get clearer about what we mean by a "ground project" or "identity-conferring commitment." If such desires and commitments are simply ones that are connected to the individual's deepest psychological impulses, then they would not necessarily be endorsed. One simply does, as a matter of psychological fact, care deeply about a particular project. Williams sometimes speaks this way. In his words, a person who has a ground project simply "finds his life bound up with it." Understood this way, there is no reason to suppose that what one psychologically identifies with is necessarily also what one endorses and what makes one's life meaningful and worth living. Thus there is no reason to suppose that losing such identity-conferring projects necessarily poses any special threat to integrity. In trying to cure himself of "what he found his life bound up with," Duberman assumed that he was acting *with* integrity, not undermining his integrity. And insofar as we imagine that Gauguin, in pursuing "what he found his life bound up with," acted merely on a psychologically deep impulse without critically reflecting on the value of doing so, we may suspect him of not acting with integrity.

In short, integrity involves fidelity to one's endorsements, not merely to psychologically deep identifications. Although it may happily be true of many of us that we want to be who we are—that endorsement and psychological identification coincide—this is not inevitable. One may deeply identify oneself with some nonendorsed desires, and living up to one's endorsements can exact a terrible toll on psychological identity. When endorsement and identification conflict, the price of trying to become a self we take to be better is not our integrity.

One might try to preserve the basic idea that integrity is connected to identity and fidelity to self by shifting to a deliberative notion of identity. From a deliberative point of view, we might understand who we are in terms of our considered judgments about what is of value, what principles ought to be endorsed, and how they should be hierarchically ranked.²⁴ Thinking of identity this latter way, Gabriel Taylor observes that some of a person's evaluations concern trivial matters and "do not contribute to her identity."²⁵ Those that do contribute to identity are more properly described as identity-conferring commitments. Such commitments, in Lynn McFall's words, "reflect what we take to be most important and so determine, to a large extent, our (moral) identities," as well as what we can do and survive as the persons we are.²⁶

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This idea that integrity requires fidelity to our core values sounds right. But one might question whether integrity is *just* a matter of being true to (and unself-deceived about) identity-conferring commitments. If integrity is just a matter of standing on principles or values that are central to one's identity, it would follow that betraying or being self-deceived about principles or values that are more peripheral to one's sense of self would not cost a person her integrity. This is precisely the conclusion Jeffrey Blustein draws. He says, "Not every instance of weakness of will, of acting contrary to one's better judgment, and not even repeated akratic failure, necessarily indicates a lack of integrity. There must be a deficiency in self-control with respect to commitments or principles that have some bearing on the agent's broad conception of his or her life's direction or sense of self-identity."²⁷ He draws a parallel conclusion about self-deception.²⁸ It would seem, then, that on matters that are not strongly connected to one's sense of self-identity, one cannot act without integrity. But this does not seem right. We recognize persons with integrity not only by their willingness to incur great losses for the sake of what they hold most dear but also by their conscientiousness in smaller matters having no strong bearing on "the agent's broad conception of his or her life's direction." We expect persons of integrity not only to stand up for their most deeply held and highly endorsed commitments but also to treat *all* their endorsements as ones worthy of being held by a reflective agent.²⁹

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In sum, the identity picture of integrity equates the conditions under which we can go on as the same self with the conditions for integrity. But acting on the deep impulses that define our psychological sense of self seems to have little to do with integrity, given that agents may repudiate their deepest impulses. Acting on those deeply held and highly endorsed commitments that define our sense of self, though constituting *part* of what it means to act with integrity, does not appear to constitute the whole of it.

III. The Clean-Hands Picture of Integrity

Running throughout both pictures of integrity presented so far is the thought that integrity is importantly connected to an agent's endorsements. The clean-hands picture offers a different take on this same theme. On this picture, integrity is a matter of endorsing and, should the occasion arise, standing on some bottom-line principles that define what the agent is willing to have done through her agency and thus the limits beyond which she will not cooperate with evil. A person has integrity when there are some things she will not do regardless of the consequences of this refusal. In bottom-line situations, she places the importance of principle and the purity of her own agency above consequentialist concerns.

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Williams has also been a key advocate of this conception of integrity, although philosophical discussions of dirty hands and choosing the lesser of two evils generally square off standing on principle and integrity against compromising with evil to secure a better outcome. Like the other pictures of integrity, this one, too, has intuitive appeal. It captures, in a way the identity picture does not, the kind of thinking we expect behind principled refusals: not "I couldn't go on as the same person if I did this" but "I would be doing a wrong." It also captures better than the identity picture what it means to stand for something. Standing for something is not just a matter of personal *identification* with certain values; it is also a matter of insisting on the *endorsability* of those values.

Like the other two pictures of integrity, this one, too, emerges within a larger philosophical context. Williams was interested in challenging what he took to be two tenets of utilitarianism: (1) we are just as responsible for preventing others from doing evil as we are for refraining from evil ourselves, thus agents must be prepared to dirty their hands and perform morally repugnant deeds if doing so will prevent others from committing even worse deeds; and (2) so long as we maximize beneficial outcomes we have no reason to feel regret, guilt, shame, and the like no matter what we have had to do to maximize outcomes.³⁰ Both

tenets, in Williams's view, are incompatible with agents' maintaining a sense of their own moral integrity. To have integrity is to view some actions as morally disagreeable apart from their consequences and to reflect that view in one's actions and sentiments. Thus persons with integrity will sometimes refuse to maximize good consequences when this means doing something morally disagreeable. They will also regret doing morally disagreeable acts on those occasions when circumstances require doing a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater one.

p. 138 I want to come at the criticism of the clean-hands picture of integrity via a more indirect route than I took with the preceding pictures. Specifically, I want to begin by examining this thought that some moral theories are more hospitable to acting with integrity than others. At one end of the spectrum of moral theories is strict consequentialism. Here, standing on principle when one could instead make the best of a bad situation would never be justified; and so, the reasoning goes, consequentialism accords integrity little or no moral value. On the other end of the spectrum is utopian deontology, where being morally justified hinges on acting on those principles that would be acceptable in an ideal moral world. Here, standing on principle is *de rigueur* no matter how dreadful the consequences of doing so. (Recall, for example, Kant's insistence on dealing truthfully with the murderer at one's door.) Thus one would always be justified in refusing, on principle, to cooperate with evil; and so, the reasoning goes, utopian deontology makes integrity a supreme value. In the middle are various moderate positions that accord both principles and consequences justifying weight. A moderate position might sometimes require cooperating with evil and sometimes require standing on principle, depending on what the lesser evil is.³¹ Alternatively, or in addition, a moderate view might regard standing on principle as a permissible but not a required option.³² Moderate moral theories, it might be thought, place some, but not supreme, value on acting with integrity. Thus they sometimes recommend acting with integrity and sometimes recommend compromising one's integrity.

Because some of the more striking examples of acting with integrity involve refusing to compromise one's principles, it is indeed tempting to think that advocating a particular theory of moral justification entails placing a higher or lower value on acting with integrity, depending on how much justificatory weight is put on deontological principles versus consequences. But that temptation should be resisted. It does not follow from the fact that persons of integrity "act on principle," and the fact that deontological theories recommend "acting on principle," that deontological theories are integrity-friendly theories. Consideration of the preceding two pictures of integrity has suggested that acting with integrity involves acting on *one's* own principles. However, when a theory of justification recommends "acting on principle," it is not recommending that people act on *their own* principles. It is recommending that people act on the *right* principles. Thus a deontological theory may sanction acting on principle without sanctioning the agent's acting on *her own* principles—that is, without sanctioning her acting with integrity.

p. 139 In short, a theory of moral justification places value on having *good* reasons for action. If it also places value on acting on principle, it does so only insofar as the principle supplies a good reason. By contrast, to value integrity is to place value on an agent's acting from *her* reasons, whether they are good ones or not.³³ This means that no theory of moral justification is inherently hospitable to integrity. Both deontology and utilitarianism may recommend courses of action that conflict with the agent's own principles. Both deontology and utilitarianism only contingently sanction acting with integrity. That sanction depends on the agent's first endorsing the moral theory, thereby making theoretically *good* reasons also the agent's *own* reasons.

Now, even if one gives up the idea that utilitarianism is uniquely unfriendly to integrity, one might still think there is something to the clean-hands picture of integrity. Integrity, one might think, requires having at least *some* nonconsequentialist principles to stand on, even if they are the wrong ones, and thus reason sometimes to regret cooperating with evil. The consequentialist has no such principles. There is nothing she would not do to optimize consequences. Thus even if she is justified in repeatedly dirtying her hands to fix a bad world, she cannot claim to have integrity. But this seems wrong. Although there is nothing she would not do *to optimize consequences*, there are things the utilitarian would not do—namely nonoptimific acts. On the old *Star Trek* series, for instance, Mr. Spock was portrayed as a diehard consequentialist on life-and-death issues, always ready to sacrifice the few for the many; and he was also portrayed as a person of impeccable integrity, willing to be one of the sacrificed few and unwilling to compromise his utilitarian principle in the face of his crewmates' insistence on the wrongness both of letting the numbers count and of cooperating with evil.

In sum, *given* that a person believes an act is wrong apart from its consequences, having integrity may indeed require that she not do it, or at least regret doing it. But integrity does not require believing that there *are* such consequence-independent wrongs.³⁴ The only necessary condition of moral integrity is that one do what one takes oneself to have most moral reason to do. For consequentialists, that will mean cooperating with evil. For nonconsequentialists, it will mean not cooperating or regretfully cooperating with evil.

Selling out

Underlying the clean-hands picture of integrity, I suspect, are often the ideas that (1) there is a right course to take when presented with the choice between two evils, or the option of compromising with opponents, or the choice between protesting and remaining silent about injustice; (2) rightness is not fully determined by consequences; and (3) having integrity just is a matter of taking the right course.³⁵ Thus the person without integrity is the one who cooperates with evil or compromises with opponents when she ought not, or who fails to protest when she should. There is something to this last statement, though not what the equation between getting it right and having integrity suggests. I have argued that integrity hinges on acting on one's own views, not the right views (as those might be determined independently of the agent's own opinion). If people without integrity do indeed cooperate, compromise, and remain silent when they ought not, the force of "ought not" cannot be "the wrong thing as determined by some (deontological) moral theory." Rather, people without integrity violate their own views. They cooperate with evil, compromise with opponents, and remain silent when their own principles and values tell them they ought not.

If this is so, how does lacking integrity differ from weakness of will? Surely not all weak-willed failures to act on one's own best judgment signal lack of integrity. Breaking a diet privately embarked on because one is lazy, or craving sugar, or just plain hungry is weak willed, but not necessarily a cost to integrity, especially if the person reproaches himself for his weakness. Self-reproach is exactly what one expects of the person of integrity who lets himself down.

To lack integrity, I suggest, is to underrate both formulating and exemplifying one's own views. People without integrity trade action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, and approval, or for escape from penalties, loss of status, and disapproval (as did the artist who cynically altered his work for gain). Or they trade their own views too readily for the views of others who are more authoritative, more in step with public opinion, less demanding of themselves, and so on.³⁶ The person who allows himself to be cajoled, bullied, bribed, or embarrassed into breaking a diet he endorses, or who rationalizes his failure with the thought that most people have lower standards of fitness that would not have required dieting in the first place, is a prime example of a person without integrity. Integrity becomes an issue—something that one risks losing and must act to preserve—particularly in contexts where there is some incentive to act on *someone else's* best judgment. Williams's well-known example of George illustrates the point.³⁷

George, an opponent of chemical and biological warfare, is offered a chemical-biological warfare research job by a utilitarian who urges George to take it, thereby preventing a more zealous researcher from doing so. George thinks that he should refuse on principle to participate in this research, regardless of the consequences. As Williams constructs the case, utilitarianism makes an external demand on agents to abandon their convictions that some acts are wrong apart from their consequences. However, any morality system, utilitarian or not, if personified and figured as a kind of stern, moralistic father who demands one's compliance with a view not one's own, will pose a threat to integrity. Agents may give in to the demand, abandoning their own judgment and acting without integrity. As Blustein correctly points out, "this has nothing particularly to do with the content of the demand that the utilitarian is making of this person."³⁸ It has everything to do with abandoning one's own judgment for another's. The more authoritative or more coercive the external demand that one do *x* rather than the *y* one thinks one ought to do, the more intense the integrity question becomes—namely the question of whether one will act on one's own or on an external judgment.

Also central to the case is the fact that others will have strong and reasonable grounds for reproaching George if he refuses the job. Both the utilitarian employer and the pragmatically minded opponents of chemical and biological warfare will think he has done the wrong thing. His wife, too, may reproach him for taking a principled stance that does not give concern for her welfare high priority. To all of these reproaches he will have little to offer but the thought "I did what *I* thought right." The greater the risk of being held to

account—reproached, condemned, penalized—by others for acting on one’s own judgment, the more central becomes the question of *whose* judgment to make one’s guide. That is, one’s integrity becomes the issue.

p. 143 Finally, central to the case is the tension between what the world as it is presently structured may require and what an ideal world would require. In an ideal world, some things ought never to happen and some acts no one should ever be called upon to do. In George’s view, chemical and biological weapons have no place in an ideal world, and no one \hookleftarrow should ever be called upon, as he is now, to advance their development in order to prevent a greater evil. One does not have to be a deontologist to appreciate that fact. The more deeply entrenched the views, and the more pervasive the actions which produce a nonideal world, the more intense the integrity question becomes—namely the question of whether to accede to others’ construction of the world by acting as best one can in present circumstances, or to act on one’s own judgment that the world is a bad one and calls upon people to do what no one should be called upon to do.³⁹

In sum, in contrasting acting on principle to maximizing outcomes, the clean-hands picture of integrity mislocates the heart of the integrity question. It is not consequentialism that threatens integrity, but our own vulnerability to other people—their bribes and threats, authoritative demands, reproaches and accusations of unreasonableness, their lower standards that make it easy to get away with violating our own, and their collective construction of a world that calls upon us to act against our ideals. We find ourselves tempted to give in, accede, pander, bow, and stoop to views we do not endorse, and to sell out, abandon, recant, conceal, and compromise too readily those we do.

IV. Personal and Social Virtues

I have argued that each of the three pictures of integrity reduces integrity to something else: to the conditions for unified agency, to the conditions for continuing as the same self, and to the conditions for having a reason to refuse to cooperate with some evils. Although persons with integrity will sometimes stand up for what they wholeheartedly endorse, or for what is central to their identity, or for deontological principles, integrity is not equivalent to doing these things. Continuing to be of two minds, conscientiousness about small matters, and dirtying one’s hands can also be matters of integrity.

p. 144 I said at the beginning of this chapter that I thought there was a second problem with the three pictures of integrity—namely that they proceed on the assumption that integrity is a personal virtue, and that this assumption wrongly limits what can be said about both the nature and value of integrity. It is to that second critique that I now turn.

Some virtues are personal, others are social, yet others are both. A personal virtue, like temperance, consists in having the proper relation to oneself—in this case, to one’s desires. Social virtues consist in having the proper relation to others. Civility, for instance, is a social virtue, a desirable mode of conducting oneself among others. Some virtues are both personal and social. Self-respect, for instance, might be thought to involve having both a proper regard for one’s own moral status (and thus the right relation to oneself) and a proper regard for one’s place among other moral beings (and thus the right relation to others); it is a virtue exercised both by holding oneself to standards and by demanding rightful treatment from others.⁴⁰

On the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands pictures, integrity characterizes an agent’s relation to herself—to her desires (they are wholeheartedly endorsed or else outlawed), to her character (she cultivates and protects its depth), and to her agency (she takes special responsibility for what gets done through it and governs herself by at least some deontological principles). Given this understanding of integrity as a personal virtue, guarding one’s integrity must be largely self-protective. It is for the sake of *my* autonomy, *my* character, *my* agency that I stand by my best judgment. Or alternatively put, it is for the sake of some specially valued feature of selves, of which I am one, that I stand by my best judgment.

p. 145 Characterizing integrity as a purely personal virtue does not imply that there is anything self-indulgent about striving to have integrity. But it does imply that integrity is not essentially connected to how we conduct ourselves among others and that its fitting us for proper social relations is not what makes it a virtue. Is there any reason to think that integrity is less like temperance, a purely personal virtue, and more like \hookleftarrow self-respect, a personal *and* social virtue? Taking the notion of “standing for something” and the self-indulgence criticism of integrity in turn, I want to suggest two reasons for not confining the analysis of integrity to understanding its nature as a personal virtue. First, doing so fails to provide us with an adequate

explication of what it means to stand for something. Second, although such analyses can counter the self-indulgence charge, they cannot make the person of integrity's relation to other persons central to that defense.

Standing for Something

I take it that the notion of standing for something is central to the meaning of integrity. Indeed, the intuitive appeal of the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands pictures lay in their articulating part of what is meant by standing for something. When, however, the analysis of integrity is confined to understanding it as a personal virtue, standing *for* something ultimately reduces to standing *by* the line that demarcates self from not-self. On the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands pictures, the adoption of principles and values as one's own establishes the line between self and not-self. Acting with integrity—that is, on one's own judgment—is thus intimately tied to protecting the boundaries of the self, to protecting it against disintegration, against loss of self-identity, and against pollution by evil. Acting without integrity undermines the boundaries of the self, whether that be accomplished through the abandonment of one's autonomy, the betrayal of one's deepest commitments, or the contamination of one's agency through association with evil. On all three views, loss of integrity signals loss of some important dimension of selfhood.

To the extent that integrity is, indeed, a personal virtue, this account of the significance of standing by one's principles and values rings true. What drops out of these accounts, however, is the centrality of standing *for* principles and values that, in one's own best judgment, are worthy of defense because they concern how *we*, as beings interested in living justly and well, can do so. When President Clinton capitulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of Congress, such as Sam Nunn, about the military ban on gays and lesbians, he was criticized, particularly by ↵ the gay and lesbian community, for lacking integrity. The force of that charge was not that he had failed to sustain (or had misrepresented) the boundaries of his self. The force of the charge was that he had treated as a matter of little significance the representation and defense of views that in one's own best judgment are the better ones. He did so either by misrepresenting his own view of the ban in the first place or by too readily conceding to a view he considered wrong. This, in the eyes of his critics, constituted less a self-betrayal than a betrayal of those counting on him to stand up for what they took to be the better view. Moreover, not standing up for one's best judgment about what would be just or what lives are acceptable forms of the good suggests that it does not really matter what we as a community of reasoners endorse. The person of integrity, one might plausibly think, is precisely the person who thinks this does matter. Integrity here seems tightly connected to viewing oneself as a member of an evaluating community and to caring about what that community endorses. That is, it seems to be a social virtue.

Self-Indulgence

The depiction of integrity as a personal virtue aimed at securing the boundaries of the self tends to provoke charges of self-indulgence. This self-indulgence charge can, I think, be countered. Even so, a further question remains as to whether accounts of integrity as a personal virtue enable us to say all the things we want to say about what makes integrity a virtue.

The self-indulgence critique goes something like this: advocates of integrity seem to place evaluative weight on the fact that a view is *one's own*. This looks self-indulgent; the identity-picture of integrity is especially prone to this criticism. On one version of the identity picture, the core principles of one's deliberative viewpoint are core principles not because one thinks them worthy of endorsement but simply because one so thoroughly identifies with them. But all three pictures, because they value standing on one's own views, are vulnerable to charges of egoism and self-indulgence.

The proper line of defense to this charge is to point out that value is being attached not to the *ownness* of a view but to something else of ↵ which formulating and acting on one's own views is an integral part. Briefly reconstructing how such arguments would go, one might say the following.

The integrated-self picture of integrity attaches value to autonomy. The project of becoming a person with integrity just is the project of becoming a fully autonomous person whose actions are determined by herself rather than by desires and values that are not truly her own. Having and acting on views of one's own is thus valuable not because of the sheer fact that they are one's own but because having and acting on views of one's own is integral to being an autonomous, free, and responsible being, which itself is valuable.

What the identity picture of integrity attaches value to is somewhat harder to specify. The thought might be that the depth of character that comes with deep commitments is an admirable characteristic of persons. Or the thought might be that deep attachments are part of any life that could count for us as a good, full, and flourishing human life. Or the thought might be that only a life containing deep attachments will be rich enough to compel our continuing interest in staying around and participating in morality. Having and acting on identity-conferring commitments is thus valuable, not because of the sheer fact that they are one's own but because having and acting on deep commitments is part of any admirable, flourishing life worth living, and *that* kind of life is what has value.

What the clean-hands picture of integrity attaches value to is again not easy to specify. One thought might be that special value attaches to taking responsibility for one's own conduct. In a quite different vein, one might claim that value attaches to adopting a deontological rather than consequentialist perspective, and thus to acting on principle itself. In either case, that the principles happen to be one's own principles is incidental and inevitable given that deliberation about which principles are endorsable will have to be conducted from within one's own deliberative viewpoint.

Although I will not attempt to do so here, I think all three views of what makes integrity a virtue might be articulated in either Kantian or utilitarian terms.⁴¹

p. 148 However, even if the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands views succeed in accounting for the virtue of integrity, one might still criticize them for excluding some important considerations from their account. Some Kantian and utilitarian arguments for the value of integrity will be ruled out as arguments also for the virtue of integrity.⁴² In *On Liberty*, for instance, Mill argues that the unrestricted representation and exchange of ideas are critical to the discovery of truth. But the discovery of truth would seem to depend not just on the freedom to speak but also on the integrity of the speakers—that is, on their commitment to publicly standing for their own best judgment of what the truth is. Kantians, too, might see some value in standing before others on one's own best judgment. From a Kantian point of view, persons are not just autonomous agents with special responsibility for their own conduct. They are also members of a community of co-legislators. The embodiment of this co-legislative aspect of persons would seem to require agent integrity—that is, a commitment to standing before others on one's best judgment, submitting it to others' critiques, and defending its fitness for co-legislation. From the standpoint of the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands pictures of integrity, however, these considerations only provide additional reasons for *valuing* integrity, not for thinking it a *virtue*. For the latter to be true, we would have had to start from an account of integrity as a *social* virtue. That is, we would have had to start from the thought that acting on one's own best judgment is integral to some common project (such as the search for truth or co-legislable principles) or to a way of comporting ourselves among others. Only if we assume that integrity is not, or not just, a matter of the individual's proper relation to herself, but is a matter of her proper relation to common projects and to the fellows with whom she engages in those common projects,

p. 149 would ↪ the utilitarian and Kantian considerations just mentioned count as articulating what makes integrity a virtue.

Contrary to the integrated-self, identity, and clean-hands pictures of integrity, I am strongly inclined to think that integrity is a *social* trait and that its fitting us for community membership is precisely what makes it a *social* virtue. Looking at integrity as a social virtue enables us to see persons of integrity as insisting that it is, in some important sense, for *us*, for the sake of what ought to be *our* project or character as a people, to preserve what ought to be the purity of *our* agency that they stick by their best judgment. It is to a picture of integrity as a social virtue that I now turn.

What, then, is the social virtue of integrity? I begin with this picture: I am one person among many persons, and we are all in the same boat. None of us can answer the question, “What is worth doing?” except from within our own deliberative points of view. This “What is worth doing?” question can take many specific forms. What evils, if any, ought one morally to refuse to do no matter the consequences? What, for philosophers, is worth writing about? What is worth keeping, what worth reforming in the social identity “black” or “woman” or “gay”? What principles take precedence over what others? What is one, if not the only, worthwhile way of conducting a good life? That they are answerable only from within each person’s deliberative viewpoint means that all of our answers will have a peculiar character. As one among many deliberators, each can offer only her own judgment. Although each aims to do more than this—to render a judgment endorsable by all—nothing guarantees success. The thought “It is *just* my judgment and it may be wrong” cannot be banished no matter how carefully deliberation proceeds. But given that the only way of answering the “What is worth doing?” question is to plunge ahead using one’s own deliberate viewpoint, one’s best judgment becomes important. As one among many deliberators who may themselves go astray, the individual’s judgment acquires gravity. It is, after all, not *just* her judgment about what it would be wrong or not \hookrightarrow worthwhile to do. It is also her *best* judgment. Something now hangs for all of us, as co-deliberators trying to answer correctly the “What is worth doing?” question, on her sticking by her best judgment. Her standing for something is not just something she does for herself. She takes a stand for, and before, all deliberators who share the goal of determining what is worth doing.

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To have integrity is to understand that one’s own judgment matters because it is only within individual persons’ deliberative viewpoints, including one’s own, that what is worth our doing can be decided. Thus one’s own judgment serves a common interest of co-deliberators. Persons of integrity treat their own endorsements as ones that matter, or ought to matter, to fellow deliberators. Absent a special sort of story, lying about one’s views, concealing them, recanting them under pressure, selling them out for rewards or to avoid penalties, and pandering to what one regards as the bad views of others—all these indicate a failure to regard one’s own judgment as one that should matter to others. The artist who alters his work of genius, making it saleable to a tasteless public, lacks integrity because he does not regard his best aesthetic judgment as important to anyone but himself. He abandons the co-deliberative perspective. And those who act for the sake of preserving their identity, but without asking whether it is worth preserving, lack integrity; this is because they do not even raise the “What is worth doing” question. “Whatever sells” and “whatever is me” cannot ground action with integrity because these reasons do not address the co-deliberative question of what is worth doing.

That hypocrites lack integrity is a common observation. Analyses of integrity as a personal virtue, however, do not plausibly explain why. On the integrated-self and identity pictures of integrity, one would have to say that hypocrites lack integrity because their actions are not integrated with their endorsements; or because in the course of pretending commitment, they are untrue to their real, identity-conferring commitments; or because sustained pretense undermines the agent’s ability to be clear and not self-deceived about what she really does endorse.⁴³ \hookrightarrow Although hypocrisy may be bad in these ways for the hypocrite, this is not typically why we charge hypocrites with lacking integrity. Hypocrites mislead. And it is because they deliberately mislead people about what is worth doing that they lack integrity. Jim Bakker, for instance, persuaded a lot of people to invest money in his doing God’s work. His embezzling revealed that he had misled them either about the value of doing God’s work or the value of his doing it. Neither the integrated-self nor the identity picture of integrity can explain why misleading others, by itself and not because of its deleterious effects on the hypocrite, has anything to do with lacking integrity. If, however, integrity is not a merely personal virtue, but is the social virtue of acting on one’s own judgment, because doing so matters to deliberators’ common interest in determining what is worth doing, then hypocritical misrepresentation of one’s own best judgment clearly conflicts with integrity.

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This view of integrity also helps to explain the shame at failure to abide by one’s own judgment as something more than mere shame at the unsturdiness of one’s will or the guilty awareness of violating a standard. If an agent passes herself off as someone who insists on the importance of private spaces, and then secretly indulges in reading another’s private letters, the thoughts “I have no self-control” and “This is wrong” are different from the thought “I have no integrity.” Neither the weakness nor the wrongness of the act immediately reveals lack of integrity. Rather, the thought “I have no integrity” accompanies the revelation of one’s inability to stand for something before others.

Finally, looking at integrity not as the personal virtue of keeping oneself intact but as the social virtue of standing for something before fellow deliberators helps explain why we care that persons have the courage of their convictions. The courageous provide spectacular displays of integrity by withstanding social incredulity, ostracism, contempt, and physical assault when most of us would be inclined to give in, compromise, or retreat into silence. Social circumstances that erect powerful deterrents to speaking and acting on one's own best judgment undermine the possibilities for deliberating about what is worth doing. We thus have reason to be thankful when persons of integrity refuse to be cowed.

p. 152 Understanding integrity as a social virtue also shifts our sense of what the obstacles to integrity might be. On the integrated-self picture, ↳ the primary obstacles to integrity are internal: self-deception, weakness of will, shoddy practical reasoning, inconsistency among and ambivalence about one's endorsements. These are no doubt obstacles. But what of contempt, ostracism, loss of a job, penal sanctions, the breakdown of friendships and familial relations, or being labeled "confrontational," "difficult," "overly sensitive," or "militant," not to mention the inexhaustible confidence of others that one is wrong? These are public obstacles to acting with integrity. Even the thickest skinned and toughest willed may find them hard to stand up against, especially on a continuing basis.

If integrity is the virtue of having a proper regard for one's own judgment as a deliberator among deliberators, it would seem that integrity is not just a matter of sticking to one's guns. Arrogance, pomposity, bullying, haranguing, defensiveness, incivility, close-mindedness, and deafness to criticism (traits particularly connected with fanaticism) all seem incompatible with integrity. All reflect a basic unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the singularity of one's own best judgment and to accept the burden of standing for it in the face of conflict. Moreover, acknowledging others as deliberators who must themselves abide by their best judgment seems part of, not exterior to, acting with integrity. Untempered by the thought "This is just my own best judgment," standing for something puts one's own and others' integrity at risk—one's own because of the temptation to supplement "standing for" with coercive pressure, and others' because coercion may work. This is to say that when what is worth doing is under dispute, concern to act with integrity must pull us both ways. Integrity calls us simultaneously to stand behind our convictions and to take seriously others' doubts about them. Thus neither ambivalence nor compromise seems inevitably to betoken lack of integrity. If we are not pulled as far as uncertainty or compromise, integrity would at least demand exercising due care in how we go about dissenting. Because we so often seek exemplars of integrity retrospectively, identifying those who championed causes that to us now are clearly worthy, it is easy to overlook what, from their earlier vantage point, acting with integrity must have looked like. Socrates, Galileo, Luther, and King acted against the best judgment of their peers, including some whom they admired. To think that caving in to their peers posed the only threat to their integrity oversimplifies the nature of ↳ integrity. Hubristic denial that others' best judgment matters posed an equal threat. However admirable those with the confrontational courage of their convictions may be, even protesters risk losing their integrity to arrogance.

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Concluding Remark

What I have had to say about integrity suggests that integrity may be a master virtue—that is, less a virtue in its own right than a pressing into service of a host of other virtues: self-knowledge, strength of will, courage, honesty, loyalty, humility, civility, respect, and self-respect.⁴⁴ My aim was to understand that service. What is a person who tries to have integrity trying to do? I have not rejected (though I have revised) the ideas that she is trying to be autonomous, or loyal to deep commitments, or uncontaminated by evils. But I have tried to argue that this is not the whole story. She is also trying to stand for what, in her best judgment, is worth persons' doing. ↳

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Notes

1. Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality" and "Moral Luck," in *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Gabriel Taylor, "Integrity," in *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); Lynne McFall, "Integrity," *Ethics* 98 (1987): 5–20; Jeffrey Blustein, *Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point of View* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Although

- what I refer to as three pictures of integrity are analytically distinct, these authors work with them as components of a complex account of integrity.
2. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971): 5–20; and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in *Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology*, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
3. Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," 38.
4. *Ibid.*, 33.
5. Taylor, "Integrity," 116.
6. *Ibid.*, 113.
7. Gary Watson, "Free Agency," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (1975): 205–220, raised the problem of wantonness in higher-order volitions. Frankfurt addresses himself specifically to Watson's critique.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, 39.
10. Thomas E. Hill Jr., "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in *Autonomy and Self-Respect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19.
11. Taylor, McFall, and Blustein all take wholeheartedness to be central to integrity.
12. Maria Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception," *Hypatia* 2 (1987): 3–19. See also Maria Lugones, "On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism," in *Feminist Ethics*, ed. Claudia Card (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 35–44, and "Hispaneando y Lesbiando: On Sarah Hoagland's *Lesbian Ethics*," *Hypatia* 5 (1990): 138–146.
13. The point here is not that one could not construct a unified identity and conceptual-normative perspective. The point is that such a unified identity would be neither Latina nor lesbian, and endorsing it would be inconsistent with giving priority to combating racist and heterosexist oppression that consists, in part, precisely in the suppression of Hispanic and lesbian identities as they are constructed in their "home" cultures. The point is also not that one cannot be critical of the identity and culture one endorses—for example, that one cannot be critical of heterosexism in one's Hispanic community. The point is that the criticism must be internal; it must take place on the background assumption that certain conceptions and evaluations of gender, sexuality, and family that are constitutive of Hispanic culture have weight. To engage in external criticism of Hispanic culture (say, from the point of view of the lesbian community) would be to dismiss the significance of that culture from the outset.
14. Lugones, "Hispaneando y Lesbiando," 138–139.
15. Martin Duberman, *Cures: A Gay Man's Odyssey* (New York: Plume, 1992), 139.
16. *Ibid.*, 140.
17. See, for example, Sarah Lucia Hoagland, *Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value* (Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988); and Kathryn Morgan, "Women and Moral Madness," in *Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory*, ed. Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1987).
18. I think it is important to be skeptical about any account of integrity whose implication is that members of oppressed groups are particularly likely *not* to have integrity or that, for them, acting with integrity requires acting in morally unsavory ways (for example, ignoring all but one oppressive system or adopting a dismissive stance toward social judgments). Lugones's and Duberman's cases suggest that achieving the ideal of an integrated self does not depend solely on an agent's internal capacities. It also depends on social conditions. The illusion that integration is entirely up to the individual may reflect a particularly privileged social position—for example, one from which the question of where one stands with respect to multiple and conflicting oppressions does not regularly come up and within which one's own self-interpretation receives substantial social confirmation.
19. Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," "Moral Luck," and "Integrity."
20. Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," esp. 14.
21. *Ibid.*, 14–15. Williams's specific discussion of Gauguin is in Williams, "Moral Luck."
22. Duberman, *Cures*, 36.
23. *Ibid.*
24. One might think that Williams meant to connect ground projects to this deliberative notion of identity and to an agent's deepest endorsements. But understood this way, there is no reason to suppose that ground projects could conflict with the agent's own view of what morality demands. If Gauguin endorses painting as his ground project—that is, as what has evaluative priority—then he has already answered for himself the question of what morality demands. It does not, in his view, demand eliminating a space for partiality to one's own projects. Gauguin's endorsement of his painterly project, reflecting as it does an antecedent rejection of utilitarian value maximization and Kantian impartiality, cannot then be offered, without begging the question, as a reason for thinking that utilitarianism and Kantianism are mistaken. Nor can it be offered as a reason for thinking that either morality system poses a threat to the agent's integrity.
25. Taylor, "Integrity," 131.
26. McFall, "Integrity," 13.
27. Blustein, *Care and Commitment*, 100.
28. *Ibid.*, 106.
29. What does seem right about Blustein's position is that some self-deception and weakness of will is compatible with an "all things considered" assessment of a person's character. In answering the question, "Is this the kind of person that, all things considered, we would describe as having integrity?" it is most relevant to look at how a person stands with respect to her core commitments. A person might be pervasively weak willed with respect to very low-order principles or to the application of core principles in fairly trivial cases, but she might exhibit great strength of will and courage in sticking to her convictions when core principles or more serious cases are at stake. If so, we might well be prepared to say that, all

things considered, she has integrity. It does not follow, however, from the fact that a person lacks integrity, all things considered, only if she is weak willed or self-deceptive about “basic goals and concerns” that a person *acts* without integrity only if she acts contrary to her basic goals and concerns. People can act without integrity—or courage, strength of will, temperance, kindness, and so on—on particular occasions while still being, all things considered, *persons* who have integrity, or who are courageous, strong willed, temperate, kind, and so on.

30. Williams, “Integrity.”
31. Terrance C. McConnell, “Moral Blackmail,” *Ethics* 91 (1981): 544–567, works out such a moderate position.
32. Thomas E. Hill Jr. argues for this on Kantian grounds in “Moral Purity and the Lesser Evil,” in *Autonomy and Self-Respect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
33. A person can be absolutely mistaken about which principles one may justifiably stand on yet act with integrity in taking the stand. When Dan Quayle stood on his pro-life principle, refusing to sanction an abortion for his own young daughter and even for a twelve-year-old raped by her father, one might have thought him hopelessly misguided; but that thought alone would not have been reason to think he lacked integrity. (If one suspected him of lacking integrity, it was because it is hard to imagine he really believed what he said.)
34. This is not to say that the thought that a person is morally mistaken has no bearing on the question of his integrity. Sometimes it is hard to imagine how someone could care about what principles they act on, be unself-deceived, sincere, critically reflective, nonhypocritical, concerned with more than their own comfort, *and* get things morally so wrong.
35. This would have to be Williams’s view if utilitarianism is going to be singled out as *the* enemy of integrity. From a deontological point of view, utilitarianism requires agents to do the wrong thing. Thus if having integrity is equivalent to doing the right thing, utilitarianism will (again, from a deontological point of view) require that agents act without integrity. What Williams could have been pointing to was the fact that utilitarianism makes external demands on agents. If integrity is a matter not of doing the right thing but of acting on one’s own (internal) views, then utilitarianism would again be an enemy of integrity. But in this case, deontology would have to be depicted as equally inimical to integrity, because it too makes external demands on the agent.
36. In thinking about integrity in terms of the value a person places on her own views, I have been influenced by Thomas E. Hill Jr.’s analysis of self-respect (“Servility and Self-Respect,” in *Autonomy and Self-Respect* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 4–18) as, in part, a matter of being unwilling to trade one’s own rights cheaply. I read his “Self-Respect Reconsidered” as in fact a discussion of integrity, because the issue there is not the value a person attaches to her own rights but the value she attaches to having and acting on views of her own.
37. Williams, “Integrity.”
38. Blustein, *Care and Commitment*, 70.
39. That we have two integrity concerns—acting on our best judgment given the world as it is and acting on our best judgment of what we ought never to be called upon to do—suggests that worlds can be sufficiently bad that acting with complete integrity is hopeless. In making her choice, Sophie confronted just such a world.
40. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Servility and Self-Respect” and “Self-Respect Reconsidered,” explores both the personal and the social dimensions of self-respect.
41. I owe this thought to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.
42. To show that a trait is a virtue is to show that something about the trait itself is intrinsically valuable. For instance, on the integrated-self picture, autonomy is both central to the trait we call “integrity” and has intrinsic value. Thus integrity is a virtue. Traits can also have extrinsic value. For instance, one might think that even though integrity is not to be *defined* as a trait that fits us for membership in a truth-seeking or moral community, this is one welcome *effect* of integrity. If so, its fitting us for community membership provides us with an additional reason for valuing integrity, though not an additional reason for thinking it a virtue.
43. Taylor and Blustein both stress the way sustained hypocrisy may result in self-deception and unclarity about what one really endorses.
44. I owe this observation to Owen Flanagan.