Course Syllabus

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
PHILOSOPHY 290: ”RECENT WORK ON BLAME AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES”

Fall 2024
Tuesday 12:10-2:00 p.m.
The Dennes Room (234 Moses Hall)

R. Jay Wallace
Office: 134 Moses Hall
Phone/Email: 394-3309/rjw@berkeley.edu
Office Hours: Thursday 3:00-4:00 p.m.
(other times by appointment)

Description

In this seminar, we will look at some recent work on the topic of moral blame. We’ll try to figure out what it is, what functions it subserves, and what hazards it presents to constructive moral relations.

We’ll start with P.F. Strawson’s massively influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, which brought the reactive attitudes into contemporary discussions of freedom and moral accountability, and which continues to be a significant touchstone for work on these topics. We’ll then turn to important recent contributions to the lively debate about moral blame, including primarily treatments that are broadly inspired by Strawson’s approach, as well as a few accounts that depart from it in various ways (for context). The seminar will end by discussing some work in progress by the instructor on the topic of reactive blame.

Some of the specific questions to be addressed include the following: What are the reactive attitudes? What contributions might they make to our practices of accountability and interpersonal blame? What are the functions of this way of responding to moral infractions, and what are its distinctive hazards? Is there a constructive role for reactive blame within the context of the unfolding relationship between wrongdoers and their victims? What scope is there for the normative assessment of reactive blame? How might reactive blame eventually be overcome—through forgiveness, or in others ways—given that its reasons would seem to persist over time?

Readings will include work by Lucy Allais, Agnes Callard, Miranda Fricker, Pamela Hieronymi, Berislav Marušić, T. M. Scanlon, Susan Wolf, and others.

Requirements

This is a graduate seminar in the Department of Philosophy; the intended audience is graduate students in the philosophy Ph.D. program at Berkeley. Those who are not graduate students in philosophy (including graduate students in other departments, advanced undergraduate students, and visitors) may enroll in or audit the course only with the express permission of the instructor.

Those taking the seminar for credit must submit a term paper, of about 18 pages (5,000-5,500 words), by Friday, December 20. Topics will be developed in consultation with the instructor; I would like to see a one-page (provisional) abstract of your term paper by Friday, December 6.

Regular participation in seminar discussions should be regarded as a requirement of the course. Those taking the seminar for credit will also be expected to post short comments or questions on readings every other week (these assignments will be managed in the "Discussions" section of the bCourses site).

Schedule of Readings

Note: Electronic copies of the readings are posted to the “Files” section of the bCourses site for this seminar.

Sept. 3:  Introductory Session

1. Blame: Its Nature and Function(s)

Sept. 10:  P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”, as reprinted in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (Routledge, 2008)

Sept. 17:  T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Harvard, 2008; notes in this file), chap. 4; Susan Wolf, “Blame, Italian Style”, in Wallace, et. al., eds., Reason and Recognition (Oxford, 2011)

Sept. 24:  Miranda Fricker, “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation”, Noûs 50 (2014); Bernard Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame”, as reprinted in his Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Oct. 1:  Pamela Hieronymi, “I Bet You Think This Blame is About You”, in Coates and Tognazzini, eds., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 5 (Oxford, 2019); David Shoemaker and Manuel Vargas, “Moral Torch Fishing: A Signaling Theory of Blame”, Noûs 55 (2018)

Oct. 8:  Angela Smith, “Moral Blame and Moral Protest”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford, 2013); Victoria McGeer, “Civilizing Blame”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms

2. Reactive Blame and its Overcoming

Oct. 15:  Agnes Callard, “The Reason To Be Angry Forever”, in Cherry and Flanagan, eds., The Moral Psychology of Anger (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018); Oded Na’aman, “The Fitting Resolution of Anger”, Philosophical Studies 177 (2019)

Oct. 22:  Berislav Marušić, On the Temporality of Emotions (Oxford, 2022), chap. 1, chap. 2, chap. 3

Oct. 29:  Berislav Marušić, On the Temporality of Emotions, chap. 4, chap. 5, chap. 6

Nov. 5:  Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001); Lucy Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008)

3. Reactive Blame and the Deontic Structure of Social Life (tentative!)

Nov. 12:  Amia Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger”; The Journal of Political Philosophy 26
2018); R. Jay Wallace, “Trust, Anger, Resentment, Forgiveness: On Blame and its
Reasons”, European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2019)

Nov. 19:  R. Jay Wallace, “Resentment and Social Friction: Reactive Blame and its Vicissitudes”

Nov. 26:  R. Jay Wallace, “The Politics of Grievance and Other Pathologies of Influence”

Dec. 3: Review

 

Some Additional Readings

Bell, Macalester, The Standing to Blame: A Critique”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms

Bennett, Christopher, “Personal and Redemptive Forgiveness”, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003)

Calhoun, Cheshire, “Changing One’s Heart”, as reprinted in her Moral Aims (Oxford University Press, 2016)

Cherry, Myisha, The Case for Rage (Oxford University Press, 2021)

Cherry, Myisha and Owen Flanagan, eds., The Moral Psychology of Anger (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018)

Chislenko, Eugene, “Blame and Protest”, The Journal of Ethics 23 (2019)

Coates, D. Justin and Neal A. Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford University Press, 2013)

Flanagan, Owen, How to Do Things with Emotions: The Morality of Anger and Shame across Cultures (Princeton University Press, 2021)

Fricker, Miranda, “Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism”, Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2019)

Garrard, Eve, and David McNaughton, ‘In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2004)

Govier, Trudy, Forgiveness and Revenge (Routledge, 2002)

Griswold, Charles, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Hieronymi, Pamela, “The Force and Fairness of Blame”, Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004)

Hieronymi, Pamela, Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals (Princeton University Press, 2020)

Hieronymi, Pamela, “Reflection and Responsibility”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 42 (2014)

Lorde, Audre, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Crossing Press, 2007)

McKenna, Michael, Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012)

Macnamara, Colleen, “Taking Demands Out of Blame”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms

Nussbaum, Martha, Anger and Forgiveness (Oxford, 2016)

Pettigrove, Glen, Forgiveness and Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)

Radzik, Linda, Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2009)

Rushdy, H. A., After Injury: A Historical Anatomy of Forgiveness, Resentment, and Injury (Oxford University Press, 2018)

Scanlon, T. M., “Forms and Conditions of Responsibility”, in Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith, eds., The Nature of Responsibility: New Essays (Oxford University Press, 2015)

Scanlon, T. M., “Interpreting Blame”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms

Sher, George, In Praise of Blame (Oxford, 2006)

Amia Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger”; The Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2018)

Walker, Margaret Urban, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Wallace, R. Jay, “Dispassionate Opprobrium”, in Wallace, et. al., eds., Reason and Recognition (Oxford, 2011)

Wallace, R. Jay, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010)

Wallace, R. Jay, The Moral Nexus (Princeton University Press, 2019)

Wallace, R. Jay, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, 1994)

Wallace, R. Jay, “Trust, Anger, Resentment, Forgiveness: On Blame and its Reasons”, European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2019)

Watson, Gary, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme”, as reprinted in his Agency and Answerability (Oxford University Press, 2004)

Watson, Gary, “Standing in Judgment”, in Coates and Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms